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Abstract
We developed a smartphone application, Ha’Midgam, to poll and forecast the results of the 2015
Israeli elections. The application was downloaded by over 7,500 people. We present the method
used to control bias in our sample and our forecasts. We discuss limitations of our approach and
suggest possible solutions to control bias in similar applications.
Introduction
The 19th Knesset, elected on January 22nd, 2013, was officially dispersed on December 8th, 2014.
The elections for the 20th Knesset, which were supposed to be held on Noveber 7th, 2017, are
to be held on March 17th, 2015, more than two years before scheduled and just two years and
two months after the previous elections.
During the weeks after the elections were declared, Ofer Moshaioff, Yoav Ram and Idan Cohen
developed a smartphone application (‘app’) called Ha’Midgam (http://hamidgam.com). This
app allowed users to anonymously vote for one of the major participating parties in the upcoming
elections (2015), to disclose their vote in the previous elections (2013), and to view a forecast of
the 2015 election results based on the aggregated data from all users.
The app was published for Android devices on the Android Play Store on December 29th, 2014
and for iOS devices (iPhone, iPad; developed by Elad Ben-Israel) on the Apple App Store on
January 26th, 2015. It quickly gained media attention on local radio shows, digital media and
newspapers. This media attention contributed to over 7,500 application downloads by March
16th, 2015.
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Our app differs from traditional polls in several aspects. In traditional polls, media outlets publish
forecasts based on a group of 500-1,000 individuals that were chosen by a polling company at a
specific point in time to reflect an unbiased sample of the population.
In contrast, our app allows users to view a realtime, online forecast of the elections based on
individuals that chose to disclose their vote. Therefore, the sample size in our app is roughly
10-fold. However, in contrast to traditional polls, our app doesn’t collect any demographic
information, such as age, socio-economical status, religion or ethnicity. Therefore, our app’s
sample may be biased and therefore requires statistical manipulation.
Our app does collect information that is unique: the app allows users to change their mind
at any time; it keep a history of user choices; it logs the precise time and, if allowed by the
device, location; and most importantly for the sake of this manuscript, the app asks users to
disclose which party they voted for in the previous elections (2013). Our hypothesis was that this
information could be enough to make a good forecast of the elections results - the distribution
of seats between the participating parties.
In this manuscript we describe how the app works, the methods we used to manipulate the data,
and the forecasts we got. We wanted to make this manuscript available before the elections day
begins and therefore this manuscript in it’s current form includes only basic analysis.
Methods
App technical description
The mobile client was developed for the Android and iOS smartphone operating systems (the
iOS version didn’t include the entire feature set). The app communicated with a RESTful API
server, developed using Python 2.7 and the Flask web application framework and hosted on
heroku, largely following a tutorial by Miguel Grinberg.
The app presents to the user a grid of the parties, including some basic information and a link
to the party home or Facebook page. The user can vote to a specific party, at which point the
results forecast screen appears. The user can view the number of seats per party. At any time
the user can change his vote. In the Android version additional features were implemented; most
importantly, users were asked to disclose their vote in the 2013 elections. In addition, users could
see the a geographical distribution of the votes by the country main administrative regions.
Seats distribution forecasting
We only describe our latest approach with some variations. The basic problem is how to control
bias in our vote sample. Although our sample has over 7,500 votes, it could be biased due to
several factors such as age, socio-economical status, and party activist propaganda.
Bias control
We started asking users for their 2013 elections choices on February 13th 2015. We used this
information, together with the 2013 elections official results to attempt to control sample bias.
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First, we take only the latest vote for each device id, both from the 2013 and the 2015 datasets.
Next, we calculate a counts matrix C with rows for 2015 parties, columns for 2013 parties: Ci,j
is the number of individuals who voted for party j in 2013 and will vote for party i in 2015.
Next, we use the counts matrix C to estimate the transition matrix M in which Mi,j is the
probability that an individual who voted for party j in 2013 will vote for party i in 2015. This
was done by normalizing the columns: Mi,j =
Cij∑
i
Ci,j
.
We then generate the 2013 results vector v from the official results data, removing counts of
parties for which we have no information as well as illegal or discarded votes. We multiply the
transition matrix by the results vector to get the forecast vector: f = C · v. The forecast vector
f describes our prediction of the number of votes each party will get in the 2015 elections.
To get a forecast of the number of seats for each party we process the forecast vector f using
the Bader-Offer method, also known as the Hagenbach-Bischoff system. In our version of the
Bader-Offer method we disregarded surplus vote agreements.
The multiplication of the transition matrix with the 2013 results vector can be viewed as giving
different respondents different weights. If ci respondents replied that they voted for party i in
2013, then in the normalized transition matrix, each such respondent has weight 1/ci. When we
right-multiply the matrix with the actual 2013 results vector v, each respondent ends up with the
weight vi/ci. With this weighting scheme, the total weight of respondents that claims to have
voted for party i in 2013 is the same as the actual number of voters for i in 2013. Our sample
now ‘agrees’ with the actual 2013 election results. To recap, we inserted a weighting scheme that
controlled for the publicly known 2013 election results.
Additional bias control
As another layer of bias correction, we experimented with fixing the number of votes received by
parties that represent four demographies to the number of votes in 2013. These demographies
are:
1. The arab sector, represented by Hadash, Balad & Raam-Taal in 2013 and by the Arab
Unified List in 2015.
2. The Ashkenazi-Orhodox sector, represented by Yahadut Ha’Tora both in 2013 and in 2015.
3. The Sfaradi-Orthodox sector, represented by Shash and Am Shalem in 2013 and by Shas
and Yachad in 2015. Because Yachad merged with Ozma La’Am for the 2015 elections, we
includied Ozma La’Am in the respective 2013 votes.
4. The liberal, pro-cannabis legalisation party, Ale Yarok.
Fixing the number of voters of the first three demographies can be justified by the relatively
constant number of seats their respective parties received in the previous three elections and
by the sectoriality of these parties. As for fixing the number of votes of Ale Yarok, this was
considered necessary because supporters of this party are known to be very active online, thus
generating biases in online surveys and polls. For example, the number of “Likes” Ale Yarok has
in Facebook is 85,709, compared with 27,205 Ha’Likud, the major right winged party, has.
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Results
Using the procedure above and based on the votes as of 16th March 2015, the app has made
these forecasts:
Party Raw Stand. Fixed: AY AY, YH, AU AY, YH, AU, S
Ha’Mahane Ha’Zioni 32 25 26 25 26
Ha’Likud 17 21 22 21 22
Yesh Atid 16 15 16 15 16
Ha’Bayit Ha’Yehudi 12 13 14 13 14
Yachad 10 9 10 9 9
Merez 13 9 9 9 9
Arab Union 0 7 8 11 12
Kulanu 6 6 6 6 6
Ale Yarok 10 6 0 0 0
Shas 4 5 5 5 0
Yahadut Ha’Tora 0 4 4 6 6
Israel Beytenu 0 0 0 0 0
The numbers in the table represent a forecast of the number of seats for each party. Raw: based
on raw data, 7,506 votes. Stand.: data standardized using a 2013 to 2015 transition matrix (see
Methods), 2,447 votes. Fixed: data standardized using the transition matrix, and number of
votes of specific parties were fixed at their 2013 values (AY: Ale Yarok; YH: Yahaudt Ha’Tora;
AU: Arab Union; S: Sash). Note that the minimal number of seats in the 2015 elections is four.
This is in contrast to previous elections in which the minimal number of seats was two.
The raw data, with obfuscated timestamps and locations, may be available upon request to the
first author, depending on the purpose of use.
Discussion
Errors and Biases
When compared to major polling companies and their ongoing polls published in the media, it
seems that several parties are under-represented while others are over-represented, even after
introducing our statistical controls. Some notable examples are:
• The left-wing party Meretz gets 9 seats but only 4-5 seats in most polls.
• The right-wing party Yachad gets 9-10 seats but only 4-5 in most polls.
• The separadic-orthodox party Shas gets only 4-5 seats but 8 in most polls.
• The right-wing party Israel Beytenu gets only 0 seats but 4-5 in most polls.
One possible source of bias is the influence of abstention (non-voting). Our approach doesn’t
include a mechanism to assess changes in turn-out. While we did ask our respondents whether
they abstained in 2013, it would be naïve to assume that they represent the non-voting pop-
ulation. A non-voter is presumably indifferent and would not participate in our poll. Those
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who do participate, probably intend to vote in 2015. We could therefore easily reach the false
conclusion that turn-out will increase to nearly 100% giving those users who reported abstention
in 2013 unreasonably high weights. Eventually we chose to ignore possible changes in abstention,
implicitly assuming that the voting population is constant and that we need only to infer if
and how they will change their vote. In particular, there are media reports that turn-out will
increase dramatically in the Arab population, which could increase the number of seats for the
Arab Union.
Other possible sources of bias are several demographic variables that we did not control. Since
we are already control for the 2013 election results (i.e. our weighted sample agrees with the
official 2013 results), the following question is of relevance to the sources of bias: In what way
are our respondents that voted for party i in 2013 different from the actual voting population
that voted for party i in 2013? Some variables that may have played a role in biasing our sample
could be:
• Age. It is reasonable to assume that young voters are more likely to vote for new, small,
niche or extreme parties than are older voters. For example, older voters who voted for
Ha’Likud in 2013 are more likely to vote again to Ha’Likud than are youngers voters, who
are in turn more likely to switch to Yachad or Kulanu. This same bias could explain the
high number of seats projected for Merez and the low number of seats projected for Israel
Beytenu.
• Sex. It is possible that men changed their minds (between 2013 and 2015) in a manner
different from women. Ha’Mahane Ha’Zioni has a high level of female representation,
including Livni who is set to become prime minister through rotation with Herzog. As
an example, women who voted for Yesh Atid in 2013 might be more likely to switch to
Ha’Mahane Ha’Zioni than men who voted for Yesh Atid in 2013.
Another source of error could be the sample size. 2013 votes were only collected from respondents
after February 13th, and only in Android devices. Therefore, the 2013 dataset contains only
~2,400 votes, roughly a third of our entire sample. Due to our methodology, it is imperative
to have a reasonable sample size for each voter ‘weight class’, which is decided in our case by
the voter’s 2013 vote. For instance, we might have 400 respondents who voted Ha’Likud in
2013, but only 5 that voted Shas. Those few respondents in the 2013-Shas weight class will get
high weights, likely leading to large errors. Due to time limitations, we did not have the time to
estimate these errors, so it is likely that they explain at least some of the deviance in our forecast.
In particular, this could explain the low number of seats projected for Shas, Yahadut Hatora or
Israel Beytenu.
Conclusion
Ha’Midgam app offered Israelis a chance to express their voice in an online, realtime, open poll
and to view a live forecast of the upcoming 2015 Israeli elections results. It is likely that our poll
suffers from sample bias. However it serves as an important proof of concept. We believe that
with better bias controls, additional demographic information and a marketing effort targeted at
specific under-represented demographics a smartphone app can become a precise poll and make
forecasts as good as the major national polls.
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